The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2) Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East

"The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2)" by A. N. Kuropatkin is a historical account written in the early 20th century. This work focuses on the military policy, strategy, and failures of the Imperial Russian Army during its campaign against Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, particularly highlighting the author's experiences and insights as a commanding general." The book serves as a retrospective examination of the reasons behind Russia’s defeats, providing a detailed analysis of military operations and the ensuing political context that affected the war's outcome. "The opening of this historical account presents the author's intention to clarify the complexities surrounding Russia's military failures in the war against Japan." It begins with a summary of the issues facing the Russian War Department over the past two centuries, addressing both the readiness of the Russian army and the strategic missteps that hindered their success. General Kuropatkin delves into various battles, the operational challenges faced in Manchuria, and the mistakes of command, while asserting that many of these failures stem from political mismanagement and a lack of vital resources. The narrative establishes a critical tone as Kuropatkin laments that the war ended prematurely despite opportunities for a decisive Russian victory, framing his observations within the context of broader historical military practices and national policy. (This is an automatically generated summary.)

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin served as the Russian Imperial Minister of War from January 1898 to February 1904 and as a field commander subsequently. Historians often hold him responsible for major Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905, most notably at the Battle of Mukden (1905) and at the Battle of Liaoyang.