The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2) Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East

"The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2)" by A. N. Kuropatkin is a historical account written in the early 20th century. The work provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian military's policies and strategies during the Russo-Japanese War, delving into the reasons behind Russia's military reversals in the conflict. Focused on the tactical and organizational aspects of the military, Kuropatkin explores how shortcomings in leadership, training, and logistics contributed to the failures on the battlefield. At the start of this volume, the author reflects on the historical context leading up to the war, emphasizing the lack of adequate tactical preparation among Russian troops. He discusses the lessons learned from past conflicts, such as the Crimean War, and highlights the challenges faced by commanders due to insufficient information about enemy forces. As the narrative unfolds, Kuropatkin outlines specific issues, such as logistical difficulties and the importance of adapting to the unfamiliar terrain of Manchuria, setting the stage for a critical examination of the military's performance throughout the campaign. (This is an automatically generated summary.)

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin served as the Russian Imperial Minister of War from January 1898 to February 1904 and as a field commander subsequently. Historians often hold him responsible for major Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905, most notably at the Battle of Mukden (1905) and at the Battle of Liaoyang.